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INTRODUCTION 
Most of the legal, philosophical, and social-science thinking 
about privacy emphasizes its value to the individual with less 
attention to its value to society. Professors Fairfield and Engel join a 
growing number of privacy scholars who are probing privacy’s value 
to society and policy options to protect privacy’s social value.1 They 
signal its social importance and also underscore weaknesses in current 
policies designed to protect privacy: “Inattention to privacy’s public-
good nature has led privacy policy astray.”2 They seek to explain how, 
and why, informed individuals who highly value privacy act in ways 
that reduce the privacy of others and of society. They explore how to 
help “promote collective action on privacy”3 in order to avoid or to 
remedy what they appropriately refer to as a “social dilemma.”4 
Applying behavioral economics to identify new approaches to 
privacy protection, they recommend four primary changes in 
approach: 1) a focus on empowering groups; 2) leveraging inequity 
aversion, reciprocity, and normativity to lessen exploitation among 
group members; 3) positive framing to promote altruism; and 4) 
communication and sanction as key components of group 
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 1. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 
385 (2015); see generally SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015). 
 2. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 392.  
 3. Id. at 393. 
 4. Id. at 392. 
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coordination.5 Behavioral economics’ view that individuals do not 
behave rationally with respect to privacy protection is widely 
supported by evidence.6 People do not read privacy notices, decline 
frequent-shopping programs, clear their online cookies, turn off their 
cell phone location tracking, or adopt any one of a myriad of options 
available to them to protect privacy. Much of the research in this area 
concludes that there is indeed a “privacy paradox”7 as individuals 
disclose personal information, despite their expressed interests in 
privacy. 
Behavioral economists suggest that this is not at all surprising, 
given some uncertainty about risks and/or rewards. People discount 
or devalue the future; therefore, privacy harms or invasions are not 
likely to immediately result from an action or inaction, but, instead, 
will, or will not, occur at a later time. In this sense, protecting privacy 
is like exercising, dieting, or saving for retirement—people may 
realize it is a good idea, but the incentive system allows, indeed 
encourages, them to put it off until a later date. Moreover, the privacy 
implications of action, or inaction, are secondary to the primary 
activity; for example, people are focused on the online transaction of 
buying a book, not on how that activity may implicate their privacy. 
With the advent of both online social networking and big data mining, 
these individual privacy calculations affect not only the individual 
herself but also others. 
Overall, I applaud the efforts of Fairfield and Engel to move 
forward the conversation on privacy as a public good, and to 
investigate the insights and directions behavioral economics might 
contribute to this conversation. In this response, I will address four 
issues raised by their analysis. I do this in the spirit of moving this line 
of thinking forward, as I agree with the authors on the need for “more 
extensive study of privacy as a public good”8 and their wish “not to 
settle a debate, but to spur further inquiry.”9 Part I will examine their 
depictions of individuals in groups to gain a better sense of what is 
still to be explored to more fully understand the relationships that are 
 
 5. Id. at 448–56. 
 6. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and 
Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015).  
 7. Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States, 11 FIRST 
MONDAY (Sept. 2006), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1394/1312 [http://perma.cc/N6PQ-
K3SL]. 
 8. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 393.  
 9. Id. at 457. 
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in play here. Part II will explore their focus on the “group” and 
suggest some ways in which it might be important to further clarify 
this concept. Part III will explain why I believe the platform on which 
groups exist and interact needs a more central place in our analysis of 
privacy as a public good. Part IV will address whether Fairfield and 
Engel’s preference for policy tools that do not rely on “government 
intervention”10 constrains the analysis needed to explore ways to 
protect privacy as a public good. This part will also examine the 
failure to recognize the government intervention involved in some of 
the policy tools they do recommend. Each of these points is 
developed briefly below, but each is also in need of further data 
collection and analysis. 
I.  INDIVIDUALS IN GROUPS 
Fairfield and Engel are interested in identifying tools that groups 
can use to sustain the production of public goods and that might also 
be employed to sustain privacy as a public good. Their focus, and 
their language, however, seems to alternate between “groups” as 
stand-alone entities and ‘individuals in groups’ or ‘members of 
groups.’ They persuasively make the case that individual-focused 
privacy approaches negatively impact others, are not effective even 
from an individual perspective, and have reached diminishing returns. 
Examining ways to empower groups in the face of what is in reality a 
social dilemma offers a compelling path for analysis. Clarity and 
consistency, however, about whether the goal is to empower “groups” 
as the unit of analysis or “individuals in groups” is necessary. I believe 
that despite the authors’ claim that “[t]he relevant privacy unit is the 
group, rather than the individual,”11 the unit on which their analysis 
actually concentrates is “individuals in groups.” 
This modification in emphasis raises the question of whether one 
can understand and operationalize an analysis based on “groups” 
without probing how individuals in groups differ from individuals 
acting individually. In other words, we might assume that individuals 
acting as individuals do so based on their calculation of their self-
interest, however accurate or flawed that might be. Individuals in 
groups are possibly making a different calculation in that they take 
into account not only their own interest as a member of the group, 
 
 10. Id. at 396. 
 11. Id. at 456. 
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but also the likely interests and behavior of others in the group. The 
authors argue that “groups and individuals have different 
incentives,”12 and that 
[i]ndividuals who face the social dilemma of privacy face three 
strong pressures to defect even if they are inclined to cooperate: 
they realize that their individual efforts will only cost them; that 
others will likewise defect over time; and that the development of 
technology tends toward ever-greater intrusions on privacy.13 
The result is that “the generosity of volunteers with respect to 
their personal data creates a system that almost exclusively impacts 
others.”14 
The focus on individuals acting as members of groups and not 
merely as isolated individuals adds a valuable dimension to our 
understanding of privacy actions and inactions. If this is indeed the 
case, then a key dilemma or problem is to make it possible for 
individuals to realize that they are members of groups and that their 
actions affect not only themselves but also others in their groups. As 
Fairfield and Engel elaborate the argument that privacy is a public 
good, they reiterate that “[i]n weighing important decisions about 
privacy, individual and group incentives diverge. And without 
measured intervention, individuals’ fully informed privacy decisions 
tend to reduce overall privacy, even if everyone cherishes privacy 
equally and intensely.”15 Individuals do not recognize that the sum of 
the potential damage from one’s own and others’ disclosures results 
in a social balance that is negative.16 
The objective then becomes how to get individuals to realize that 
their individual behavior affects not only themselves but others as 
well—and in some cases others whom they care about deeply, for 
example, family members. This is an important refocusing for the 
discussion of privacy and for the development of options for 
protecting privacy. As privacy scholars move in this direction, we 
should draw upon the insights of sociologists17 and social 
 
 12. Id. at 400. 
 13. Id. at 433 
 14. Id. at 406. 
 15. Id. at 423. 
 16. See id. at 396–421 (describing the negative externalities associated with information 
disclosure). 
 17. See generally, e.g., IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: 
PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, TERRITORY, AND CROWDING (1976). 
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psychologists,18 as well as communication scholars,19 to better 
understand individual behavior in groups. The research on privacy 
behavior on social-networking sites provides some valuable 
applications of the insights of sociologists, social psychologists, and 
communication scholars. The current policy focus on individual 
control “complicates group efforts to maintain coordination in the 
face of a social dilemma.”20 As Fairfield and Engel point out, it is 
therefore necessary to shift the focus from empowering individuals to 
improving group coordination21 so that groups are empowered to 
resist privacy's social dilemma.22 To achieve this it seems necessary 
not only that individuals in groups are given the means to coordinate 
in ways consistent with such ends, but also that “the social and 
systemic harms caused by the collection, aggregation, and 
exploitation of data”23 are recognized by the law. 
II.  TYPES OF GROUPS 
As we move the analysis to improving group coordination, it 
becomes necessary to differentiate groups. Fairfield and Engel 
analyze two group characteristics that they think are relevant to the 
online privacy debate: first, size, which they conclude does not alone 
disqualify groups from cooperating on better privacy outcomes;24 and 
second, player heterogeneity and conditional cooperation.25 Based on 
their analysis of both characteristics, Fairfield and Engel conclude 
that neither of these is determinative but both play a role. They 
deduce that “[s]mall, tightly nested groups” will find it easier to 
cooperate and receive more from cooperating with one another,26 and 
that “one is more likely to cooperate in an environment in which each 
 
 18. See generally, e.g., Jacquelyn Burkell & Alexandre Fortier, Privacy Policy Disclosures 
of Behavioural Tracking on Consumer Health Websites, 50 PROC. AM. SOC’Y. INFO. SCI. & 
TECH. 1 (2013) (describing privacy-policy challenges in the context of consumer-health 
information).  
 19. See generally, e.g., SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF 
DISCLOSURE (2002). 
 20. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 411. 
 21. Id.  
 22. See id. at 413–14 (describing the traditional focus on individuals, and the need for a 
focus on groups).  
 23. Id. at 425. 
 24. Id. at 441–44. 
 25. Id. at 444–48. 
 26. Id. at 443. 
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person is perceived to benefit from privacy equally.”27 The universe of 
online groups that fall within these two parameters, however, is likely 
to be somewhat limited, and the examination of other group 
characteristics, as well as the interactions among these, will require 
further research and analysis.  
In terms of group characteristics that are likely to affect the 
groups’ aptitude for cooperating on privacy, three appear to be 
important: the context of the group, its internal dynamics, and the age 
of its members. Helen Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual 
integrity provides a logical dimension to explore the capacity and 
inclination of a group to cooperate to protect privacy.28 For example, 
book clubs for mystery readers are less likely to share similar norms 
about privacy and more likely to find this context less critical to their 
overall privacy than support groups for those with a terminal disease. 
Those who share a professional identity are likely to fall somewhere 
in between the two. Context here may provide an umbrella concept 
for a number of group characteristics which sociologists distinguish—
such as sense of unity, common goals, similar behavior, and reciprocal 
relations. But context also draws attention to the notion of shared-
informational norms, which, as Nissenbaum states, “define and 
sustain essential activities and key relationships and interests, protect 
people and groups against harm, and balance the distribution of 
power.”29 
The internal dynamics of a group are also likely to be relevant to 
achieving cooperation. Close-knit groups may initially be seen as 
more likely to be able to cooperate and protect privacy. Such groups 
share a common goal, generally know each other rather well, interact 
frequently, and have developed some understanding of group 
members. At the same time, the internal dynamics of such a group are 
likely to affect the group’s capacity to coordinate on privacy 
protection. In this sense, such groups may be like families—functional 
or dysfunctional in their own idiosyncratic ways—or cliques with their 
own power dynamics. These peculiarities are likely to play out in 
ways that may not be particularly privacy friendly, as information 
about other members in the group, especially potentially 
 
 27. Id. at 446. 
 28. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). 
 29. Id. at 3. 
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embarrassing information, is often used by others to leverage 
influence or control within the group itself. 
Interestingly, the age of group members may also affect the 
group’s ability to cooperate and protect privacy. Despite common 
perceptions that young people do not care about privacy and share 
everything online, empirical studies demonstrate that they do care 
about privacy and take actions to shield information in different 
ways.30 Young people interact with their online communities in quite 
complex ways and for a variety of purposes including personal 
identity formation, strengthening of friendships, developing of a 
range of skills and competencies, self-presentation, and identity play.31 
Young people do not regard privacy and publicity as a zero-sum game 
but instead as “co-created through social interactions; both privacy 
and publicity coexist in a dynamic negotiation of boundary setting 
that seeks to manage a multiplicity of revelations and a multiplicity of 
audiences.”32 
The discussion of groups above highlights their variety and 
complexity, leading to the conclusion that not all groups are equal, 
and raising the question of whether the tools for coordination and 
communication can operate similarly across groups. In developing a 
typology of group characteristics to differentiate the ability of group 
members to cooperate to achieve more privacy for the group as a 
 
 30. See EGIRLS, ECITIZENS (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds., 2015); VALERIE STEEVES, 
YOUNG CANADIANS IN A WIRED WORLD, PHASE III: TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2014) (ebook), http://mediasmarts.ca/sites/mediasmarts/files/pdfs/publication-report/full/
YCWWIII_Life_Online_FullReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/AS5X-VNNY]; Sonia Livingstone, 
Mediating the Public/Private Boundary at Home: Children’s Use of the Internet for Privacy and 
Participation, 6 J. MEDIA PRAC. 41 (2005); Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social 
Networking in the United States, 11 FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.firstmonday.org/
article/view/1394/1312 [http://perma.cc/44G5-8K7A]; danah boyd & Alice E. Marwick, Social 
Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, Practices and Strategies (unpublished paper 
presented at Oxford Internet Institute’s “A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the 
Dynamics of the Internet and Society”) (Sept. 22, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1925128_code1210838.pdf?abstractid=1925128&mirid=1 [http://perma.
cc/DQ6J-R2NL]. 
 31. See generally Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content 
Creation: Teenagers’ Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-Expression, 
10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393 (2008); Leslie Shade, Internet Social Networking in Young 
Women’s Everyday Lives: Some Insights from Focus Groups, OUR SCHS. / OUR SELVES, 
Summer 2008, at 65; Patti M. Valkenburg & Jochen Peter, Preadolescents’ and Adolescents’ 
Online Communication and Their Closeness to Friends, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 267 
(2007). 
 32. Valerie Steeves & Priscilla Regan, Young People Online and the Social Value of 
Privacy, 12 J. INFO., COMM. & ETHICS SOC’Y 298, 302 (2014). 
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whole, Sandra Petronio’s Communication Privacy Management 
(CPM) framework is relevant: “CPM proposes that initial disclosures 
set into motion a need for boundary coordination because there is an 
expected guardianship of the information often assumed by both the 
discloser and the recipient.”33 She proposes five types of decision 
criteria that are used in the development of privacy rules: cultural, 
gendered, motivational, contextual, and risk-benefit.34 She also 
suggests that individuals set these boundaries differently depending 
on the stage of their lives (child, adolescent, adult, and elderly).35 
The complexity of groups also raises the question of whether 
“group” is the correct term to employ in these discussions or whether 
“social network” more appropriately captures reality. Social network 
provides a more fluid sense of today’s relationships as well as a focus 
on both the flow of information and the pivotal role of particular 
individuals or nodes within the network. It also highlights the 
overlapping nature of these types of relationships. Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz suggests four factors, all quite similar to those identified 
above for groups, that affect how information will be disseminated in 
a network: the structure of the network, including whether there are 
weak ties or strong ties; the presence or absence of supernodes; 
cultural variables, such as existence of legal or social norms and 
knowledge of values of others in the network; and the nature of the 
information itself, including whether it is timely, complex, and likely 
to degrade or endure.36 Similarly, Alice Marwick and danah boyd 
view the current information and cultural landscape as creating 
“networked publics” and necessitating a conceptualization of privacy 
that moves “from an individualistic frame to one that is networked.”37 
III.  PLATFORM ON WHICH GROUPS OPERATE 
The reality is that most of the groups of interest to Fairfield and 
Engel are online groups and most online groups are not self-forming, 
self-organizing, or self-governing entities, and thus are not in total 
 
 33. PETRONIO, supra note 19, at 11. 
 34. Id. at 24–26. 
 35. Id. at 26–27. 
 36. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy 22–45 (U. Chi. Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Law & Econs. Paper No. 230, 2004), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/230-
ljs-privacy.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL8U-9UAB].  
 37. Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context 
in Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051, 1052 (2014). 
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control of their rules and possibilities. The architecture of a site 
shapes the group and sets the rules. The architecture and rules are 
determined by the business model of the social networking site, not 
by the interests of the users or groups on the site. The ability of the 
group to control privacy is constrained and determined by what the 
social network or online platform permits. Privacy defaults, system 
architecture, nested systems—basically as Lawrence Lessig pointed 
out early in these debates, “code”38—are determinative not only of 
privacy possibilities and options but also of a group’s prospects for 
coordinating and communicating. In order to seriously consider the 
potential effectiveness of coordination and collaboration among 
members of groups on social networking sites, we need a more 
complete and realistic understanding of how the platform on which a 
group operates constrains both how much a group can empower itself 
to better coordinate and also how much a group can be empowered. 
For example, I recently received an RSVP for a professional 
event on Eventbrite and was asked if I wanted to see whether anyone 
else I knew responded that they were coming—the website being 
willing to share with me information that others might not realize 
would be shared, as well as providing incentives for me to attend (or 
possibly not attend) depending on who else was attending. Similarly, 
Instagram suggests people whom I should follow; this occurs not at 
the initiative of those people, but at Instagram’s analysis of who in my 
“group” is following whom. And Google recommends whom I should 
add to my circles or my Google+, informing me of “who I may know.” 
Fairfield and Engel note the reality of such interconnections: 
“Engaging with social media is . . . not an individual choice. It is an 
inevitable outcome of being in almost any social situation.”39 But what 
occurs online seems far less “inevitable” and far more structured by 
the platforms and interests of the social-media in question. Under 
these circumstances, the social media platform is organizing the 
group, not the group members. How then can group members 
communicate and coordinate to protect their shared interest in 
privacy unless the social media platform cedes control to the group 
members? 
The type of control necessary to achieve the degree of 
communication and coordination that Fairfield and Engel propose is 
not provided by current privacy notices and settings, or by standard 
 
 38. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
 39. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 402. 
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“terms of use” agreements. For example, Facebook’s Data Policy 
states: 
When you use third-party apps, websites or other services that use, 
or are integrated with, our Services, they may receive information 
about what you post or share. For example, when you play a game 
with your Facebook friends or use the Facebook Comment or Share 
button on a website, the game developer or website may get 
information about your activities in the game or receive a comment 
or link that you share from their website on Facebook. In addition, 
when you download or use such third-party services, they can access 
your Public Profile, which includes your username or user ID, your 
age range and country/language, your list of friends, as well as any 
information that you share with them. Information collected by 
these apps, websites or integrated services is subject to their own 
terms and policies.40 
Nor is such coordinating control for a group provided by privacy 
seals or ratings that are often unclear to users and may not be 
administered by the rating organization in a responsible and effective 
manner.41 Fairfield and Engel’s recognition of the importance of 
developing tools by which individuals in groups and social networks 
can discover in a meaningful way the information-flow implications of 
their decisions, as well as how those decisions affect the flow of 
information about others, opens an important avenue for theoretical 
and policy work. 
What types of tools might be available for groups to cooperate, 
even in the environment of large social networks with their current 
business models? Fairfield and Engel suggest several: given the value 
of repeat play in fostering cooperative behavior, a “featured contact” 
widget to remind users of those with whom they have not interacted 
recently, a feature that would aggressively promote the privacy-
seeking actions of others, a “like” feature for privacy-enhancing 
technologies, simplified terms of service, and opt-in permission for 
the sharing or selling of information.42 In some instances, for example 
opt-in permissions, such tools have not been supported by business 
 
 40. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy [https://perma.cc/
MB7E-ZW6Q]. 
 41. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived 
Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through-its 
[https://perma.cc/3WRE-HC88]. 
 42. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 439. 
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and other website operators as, given the costs on the business, there 
is little incentive to provide them.43 Other tools, such as the “featured 
contact” widget, are likely to be perceived as “creepy” by users, as the 
reaction to Facebook’s News Feed demonstrates.44 As Fairfield and 
Engel note, tools to permit users to differentiate groups are valuable 
and are already embedded in social networks sites where the site 
administrator has made them available.45 Additional privacy 
enhancing technologies,46 some types of privacy-by-design,47 or 
“differential privacy”48 provide promise for user control that could be 
employed for collaboration and coordination among members of 
groups. But also needed are more system-wide—rather than site-
specific—means for differentiating spaces or places where individuals 
who share interests and common levels of privacy as a public good are 
able to organize themselves. 
This might entail a categorization of different types of online 
spaces or places. For such a categorization to work effectively and be 
easily understood, it would need to be universal, not particular to one 
social networking platform or site. It would also need to be global, 
given that many online social groups cross national boundaries. Such 
a scheme is likely to involve Internet standards setting, governance 
organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) or the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), or a coordination similar to 
that provided by Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN). These are all international bodies, generally non-
profit rather than business or government, with some responsibility 
for the effective operation of the backbone and coordination of the 
Internet, focused on architecture, protocols, and memorandums of 
understanding. 
 
 43. See Priscilla M. Regan, Safe Harbors or Free Frontiers? Privacy and Transborder Data 
Flows, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 2, 263–82 (2003).  
 44. E.J. Westlake, Friend Me if You Facebook: Generation Y and Performative 
Surveillance, 52 TDR: THE DRAMA REV., Winter 2008, at 4, 21–40.  
 45. See, e.g., Using Twitter Lists, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/76460# 
[http://perma.cc/VR9J-H5QE]. 
 46. Sarah Spiekermann & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Engineering Privacy, 35 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, Jan./Feb. 2009, at 67, 67–82. 
 47. See Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis 
of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1349–77 (2013).  
 48. Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy: A Cryptographic Approach to Private Data 
Analysis, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 
296, 301 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014). 
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If the Internet has now become essential to social life, then a 
similar backbone and architectural design for group coordination for 
public goods, such as privacy, might indeed be necessary. As Fairfield 
and Engel persuasively argue, the “public bad” of lack of privacy is 
not only a bad deal for the community of users at the time 
information is revealed, they potentially grow worse over time. The 
public bad of lack of privacy increases over time as . . . 
[t]echnological increases in storage capacity and in the predictive 
power of machine analytics undermine incentives to seek privacy.49  
Given that the collective value, efficiency, and usefulness of the 
Internet is likely to be negatively impacted if the public bad of lack of 
privacy continues to accrue, various components, including online 
platforms, may begin to recognize the value of an overall 
coordination mechanism that would easily signal to users the privacy 
norms and communication tools for a particular part of that online 
platform. The goal here would be to make visible the privacy 
implications which to date have effectively remained invisible to 
those affected. 
IV.  ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
If the goal is to help “promote collective action on privacy,”50 
then another critical avenue for further research is to determine what 
the appropriate role of government is under particular circumstances. 
Fairfield and Engel recognize the difficulties of codifying stronger 
privacy protections and suggest that if groups were “aided in their 
struggle to produce public goods by institutions, such as 
communication, framing, or sanction . . . communities can manage 
public goods without heavy-handed government intervention.”51 
The authors are somewhat less clear on what kind of government 
intervention would be needed to aid groups in their struggle. They 
appear to favor tools “that permit groups to sustain cooperation and 
protect privacy even without direct government intervention.”52 They 
note that other analysts are exploring an approach to protecting 
privacy as a public good that is informed by environmental law and 
view this as a valid approach, and one well-suited for dealing with 
 
 49. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 1, at 424. 
 50. Id. at 393. 
 51. Id. at 386. 
 52. Id. at 396.  
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large-scale bad actors which “may be necessary to restrain mass 
consumer surveillance” but may not “succeed in the current political 
climate.”53 The path identified by Fairfield and Engel focuses instead 
on “the small but constant contributions that users make exposing 
data about one another, the prisoners in a prisoners’ dilemma.”54 
However, this does raise the question of whether this path is 
consistent with—or realistic in light of—what they describe earlier as 
the “hybrid corporate-government dragnet surveillance”55 and the big 
data practices currently receiving more attention and traction. 
At the same time, they draw a parallel with other public goods: 
“Clean air, safety, roads, and the common defense all share the same 
incentive structure.”56 But in these cases, the group rules and 
structural conditions are all the result of government intervention and 
regulation. The authors, however, do not address the question of 
whether self-regulation, absent government action, would actually 
work to achieve their desired end. I am skeptical that self-regulation 
would work—both because the last thirty years of a self-regulatory 
approach provide evidence of its limits unless the interests of the 
companies and the interests of the consumers are perfectly aligned, 
and because giving groups more ability to self-organize is not in the 
interests of most websites. Thus some level of regulation appears 
necessary to require public, private, and non-profit websites to 
provide rules and tools for groups to communicate, frame, and 
sanction. 
There is growing recognition that these complex organizational 
systems are not only technological systems, but that they are also 
more fundamentally socio-technical systems.57 In these complex 
systems, as Fairfield and Engel convincingly demonstrate, lack of 
privacy is a public bad. They note that, according to the public bad 
model, if “each user were to sum up the potential for damage 
resulting from her own and everybody else’s disclosure, she would see 
that the social balance is negative—implying that no one would want 
to join a social network where the business model is based on 
disclosing private information.”58 Yet people do, in droves. Although 
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Fairfield and Engel wish to “focus less on large-scale offenders who 
are most analogous to the factories of environmental-law analysis,”59 
and more on small groups, the reality is that even small contributions 
are made on the platforms of the large-scale offenders and as part of 
an even larger integrated infrastructure of information exchanges. 
Under these conditions, as I have argued elsewhere in more 
detail, a more active role for the government appears essential.60 If 
privacy is viewed not as a private good but as a public good, then the 
policy question becomes how to encourage individuals as members of 
groups and organizational platforms on which these groups operate to 
take into account social benefits and social costs. The rules and social 
arrangements necessary to achieve this must take into account the 
characteristics of these socio-technical systems, which involve public, 
private, and non-profit actors, with broad impact given the scale of 
providers and users, and which operate globally. These characteristics 
reflect the type of system that is unlikely to be able to devise and 
monitor its own rules61 and, hence, is unlikely to self-regulate 
effectively. Elinor Ostrom suggests that under these conditions there 
are several principles that need to be taken into account in designing 
rules and institutions, including support by higher authorities, 
establishment of clear definitions for access to the systems and clear 
boundaries, participation by users in devising rules, and low-cost 
conflict-resolution mechanisms.62 
The government’s role does not have to be “heavy-handed” or 
innovation stifling, but it does need to be designed to keep the online 
platforms, on which individuals interact in groups and with public and 
private organizations, accountable for their information practices. 
Oversight by an independent authority and auditing of organizational 
practices are both the types of policies that might enable individuals 
in groups to both actually see the information flows within and 
outside their groups, and also negotiate and modify in ways to better 
protect their privacy. If privacy is a public good and lack of privacy a 
public bad, then policy needs to recognize that the overall 
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transmission architecture of the Internet constitutes a critical 
infrastructure, and that protecting privacy on the Internet is as 
important as protecting security and reliability. Policy may also 
consider whether some online platforms, such as Facebook and 
Google, have achieved the breadth, reach, and importance that they 
should be viewed as “public trustees” with government standards 
requiring that they operate in the “public interest.”63 
CONCLUSION 
Fairfield and Engel close by stating that “[t]he highest aspiration 
of an academic article is not to settle a debate, but to spur further 
inquiry.”64 I have written this response in that same spirit and am 
convinced of the need for “a more balanced debate about the 
tensions between individuals and groups in the privacy context.”65 
This debate has clearly begun and is enriched by the empirical data, 
theories, and insights of economists, lawyers, political scientists, 
psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, computer scientists, and 
engineers. The social dilemma of privacy has intrigued a large and 
growing cohort of multi-disciplinary scholars who are increasingly 
seeking to affect policy decisions. Privacy as a Public Good promises 
to generate more empirical and theoretical work. 
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